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Analyzing the Demand Side Approach to Housing
&e Nation's Poor, Using Grand Rapids Data
'_,
John W. Reifel
Editor's note: This article discusses one aspect
of a major study recently completed by
Associate Professor John W. Reifel, of the
Economics Department. The work was
funded by a grant from the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development.
The Housing Act of 1949 established as a
national goal the "provision and availability
of a decent home and suitable living environ,
ment for every American family." In ecent
d
ears a maJ'or policy deb te h b e r
Y
a or
as a supply
e n wage
side
as to whether a demand side
approach would be more efficient at helpin
the country meet the 1949 goal. A supply Sid~
approach increases the housin to k th 0 h
programs that subsidize new ~:ns~ructro~~r
rehabilitation of existing units. A demand side
approach directly subsidizes poor households
financially to enable them to rent or purchase
larger and better quality housing.

•

•

Historically, this country has relied on a
supply side approach toward improving hous
ing conditions for the poor. Public hOUSing,
below market interest rate subSidy programs,
and the New Construction component of the
Section 8 Housing Program have generated
new housing specifically for the poor. Fi
nanciall Y overshadowing these programs,
owever, have been the federal income tax
rovisions that subsidize homeowners by
allowing them to exclude from income the
potential rental value of housing services
received, yet itemize as deductions the mort
gage interest and property tax costs of
generating the services. In fact, the annual
cost to the Treasury of these tax provisions,
the bulk of which are realized by middle- and
upper'income homeowners, exceeds all of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (H.U.D.) spending on construc
tion specifically designed for poor households.
These tax break subsidies to homeowners lead
to improved housing conditions for poor
households through a filtering process. Over
long periods of time, as housing units age and
the neighborhoods deteriorate, individual
housing units frequently filter down from the
middle- and upper-income households who
built them to households with successively
lower economic status. If the neighborhood
continues to decline, eventually the poor are
able to move in when those who are
economically better off vacate their houses
and move to a better neighborhood.
Economists have observed that this supply
side approach is a very slow and indirect way
to improve housing conditions for households
currently living in units with serious defi
ciencies.
In recent years many economists have ad
vocated a policy switch to a demand side ap
proach. Subsidizing the buying power of poor
households would provide them with the pur
chaSing power to re-enter the housing market

and rent or buy better quality units. Slum
housing exists not because landlords take ad
vantage of poor tenants but rather because
landlords are business people who, in order
to avoid economic losses, must provide a level
of services that matches the low-rent,paying
ability of their tenants. If the rent'paying ability
of the poor were to be raised by a housing
allowance, they would shop for better hous,
mg. Competition among the many suppliers
in any given housing market would assure that
higher rents would buy better housing and not
. Iy 'In fl ~ t e pro f'Its 0 f h
' supp I'lers. A
ousmg
simp
demand Side approach would be more ef
ficient at meeting the national housing goal
because subSidy dollars would go directly to
the l?oor, w~o would b~ able to afford better
quahty hOUSing Immedlat~ly. T.hls approach
~oul~ aVOid the current difficulties, e~pecI~lIy
m eVId~nce In .the suburbs, of selectmg SItes
for publlc.houslng developments. ~lso, smce
the mobIlIty of the poor would be Increased,
it would tend to reduce ec:momic and :a~ial
se~regatlon. Finally, since Improving eXIstm~
Units IS cheaper than new construcbon, It
should be less expensive per poor household
served.
Note that the Existing Housing component
of the Section 8 Housing Program, begun in
1974, has many elements similar to a demand
side program. The major differences are that
under Section 8 households do not have an
incentive to find least cost units (because they
must always pay 25 percent of their income)
and the subSidy (the difference between rent
and 25 percent of income) is paid directly to
the landlord
The income elasticity of demand for hous,
ing is a key policy variable in the demand side
approach. This elasticity is calculated as the
percentage increase in hOUSing consumption
that results from an increase in income divided
by the percentage increase in income. For ex,
ample, consider a household with an $800
a month income that currently pays $200 a
month in rent. If, when that household
receives an unrestricted monthly housing
allowance of $100, the household moves to
a larger or better quality unit costing $250 a
month, that household's income elasticity of
demand would be 2 [calculated as
(50/200)/(100/800) =2]. Theoretically, the
income elasticity of demand for housing can
vary from 0 (no response) to infinity. The
larger the elasticity, the more of any
unrestricted housing allowance that will go
toward improved housing.
It would, of course, be possible to design
the program to reqUire that all housing
allowance subsidies go for housing. Though
this is politically appealing to legislators and
their constituents who care about poor hous
ing but do not care to subsidize television sets
or cars for poor households, such restriCtions
Violate the economic principle of consumer
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sovereignty. The overall level of satisfaction
for a society, given any particular income
distribution (including the dollar value of sub
sidies) will be maximized when individuals are
free to choose how resources are to be used.
Realistically speaking, in order for a demand
side approach to be politically acceptable,
more stringent restrictions would have to be
placed on how the housing allowances may
be used the smaller the income elasticity of
demand for housing is, especially if it is in
elastic (less than 1.0). The current federal
d e f'IClt. d'Ictates t hese restnctlons
..
because C on
gress has refused to pass a negative income
tax (essentially a program of unrestricted in
come transfers) even when the Federal budget
deficits were low ~nd Presidents Nixon and
Carter supported It.
When this debate about the demand side
approach began back in the 1970's, the
primitive studies available at that time yielded
estimates of income elasticity that ranged from
.2 to 2.1. The methodologies employed in the
studies differed in important ways. Some
studies were based on either mean or median
values for census tracts or citi~s (aggregated
data) and others were based on observations
of individual households (micro data). Some
were based on the household's current in
come, which often fluctuates Widely from year
to year, and others were based on unobserved
permanent income, the stable income a
household expects to average over time based
on its human capital. Some studies analyzed
the behavior of owners; others analyzed the
behavior of renters. Not all the studies took
into account the fact that households do not
instantaneously change their housing con
Continued on page 8
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sumption the moment their economic circum
stances change. Neither did all of the studies
take into account the demographic
characteristics of the household such as size
and race.
To get a more precise estimate of the in
come elasticity of demand for housing and to
test how housing allowance programs with
various types of restrictions might work,
H.U.D. funded several experiments. Its major
experiment, called the Experimental Housing
Allowance Program (E.H.A.P.l, funded pro
grams in 12 cities that tested alternative
versions and aspects of a housing allowance
demand side program. The income elasticity
of demand for housing estimates derived from
E.H.A.P., which analyzed only renter house
holds, did not exceed. 72. This indicated that
the elasticity is quite inelastic. In addition to
this major experiment, H.U.D. funded several
other studies including mine.
The Census Bureau administered the
44-page Annual Housing Survey to 5,000
households in the Grand Rapids SMSA dur
ing the 12-month period beginning in March,
1976, and ending in February, 1977. The
survey includes extensive questions on hous
ing consumption and household income,
precisely what is needed to calculate the in
come elasticity of demand, but, since the data
is collected under the promise of confiden
tiality, the information is available to the public
only in summary reports. I obtained the Cen
sus Bureau's agreement that they would con
duct requested tests by agreeing to supply to
them micro data on the exterior of the Grand
Rapids housing units (which I had helped the
Kent County Health Department to collect in
1976) and individual 1976 crime totals for
each of Grand Rapids' 32 police districts
(which I calculated from a printout of all 1976
crimes supplied by the Police Department).

The data tape which the Census Bureau
created from matching and merging the three
separate data sources gave complete micro
household data on 530 owner-occupied units
and 275 renter-occupied units in Grand
Rapids.
Determining the income elasticity of
demand for housing requires the creation and
statistical estimation of models of household
demand for housing. The necessary models
were created and estimated. For owner units
housing consumption was measured as the
reported market value of the house and lot.
For renter units housing consumption was
measured as a standardized gross rent that in
cluded contract rent plus additional monthly
payment for utilities. Household income was
defined alternatively as either total current in
come received by all household members or
as a permanent income proxy created by a
prediction equation based on the household
head's education, age, sex, and race.
The major finding of my study indicated
that the income elasticity of demand for hous
ing was quite inelastic (less than 1.0). Income
elasticity estimates based on owner units
ranged from .459 to .198, while estimates
based on renter units ranged from .251 to
.156. Since the housing demand behavior of
low-income households is particularly relevant
for policy purposes, separate analyses were
conducted for the 88 owner and the 116
renter household subsamples whose incomes
did not exceed approximately 150 percent of
the appropriate official 1976 poverty
thresholds. All of the income elasticity
estimates for low-income owners and renters
were quite inelastic, ranging from .342 to
.145. Evidence was found to support the
hypothesis that among owner households,
those headed by single adults have smaller in

come elasticity of demand for housing than
those whose heads are married. For renters,
the more individuals in the household, the
more rent was paid. If the head of a renter
household was black, that had no statistically
significant effect on amount of rent paid. For
owners, most of the estimated models re
vealed that having larger households had no
effect on the value of the housing units
owned. If the head of an owner household
was black, most of the estimated models
revealed that the value of the housing unit was
significantly less. This could result from black
owners preferring lower quality housing than
whites, from racially discriminatory housing
practices, or from whites' willingness to pay
a premium to live in racially segregated
neighborhoods.
When households spend more on housing,
what housing characteristics do they purchase
more of? Though the E.H.A.P. did not at
tempt to answer this question, my study
specifically examined the demands for rooms
and for neighborhoods with low crime rates.
The income elasticities of demand for these
specific housing characteristics were found to
be inelastic in all cases except for one demand
for low crime model where the elasticity waA
-1.001.
_
The primary policy implication of all of this
analysis is that a demand side approach to im
proving housing conditions for the poor will
work only if conditions or restrictions are
placed on how housing allowance dollars may
be used. For example, some large percen
tage, such as 70 or 90 percent, of the sub
sidy dollars must be allocated to improved
housing. Or, receipt of the housing allowance
could be made conditional on the household
living in a unit that meets certain minimum
standards. The E.H.A.P. tested 17 different
possible program designs.
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